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1.  Introduction 
 
The present paper aims to study 
the correlation between the brain drain 
phenomenon and tax competition, 
phenomena which, for a long time, have 
been handled and studied in a separate 
manner by the authors.   
Although the brain drain 
concepts and the tax competition are 
connected by means of the migration 
phenomenon, still, for a long time, the 
literature studied them separately due to 
the complexity of joint analysis. 
Therefore, a series of previous 
elaborated studies (Kurien, C.T., 1999; 
Robinson, Viki, 2003; Ferro, A., 2004; 
Fagan, Frank, 2004; Mitchell, D, 2004; 
Jeff, C., 2004; Lien, Donald, 2005; 
Wildasin, D., 2005;  Pierpaolo, G., 2006;) 
have developed two separate branches 
for the brain drain and tax competition 
phenomena.  
The first is focused on the brain 
drain phenomenon from a 
macroeconomic approach and studies its 
impact upon the economic raise in 
different analysed economies.  
The second analyses the tax 
competition from the microeconomic 
perspective, being focused on the 
interaction between the migration 
phenomenon and the destination states.  
Regarding the unitary handling of 
these two phenomena, two studies draw 
our attention in a special manner:   „Brain 
drain and fiscal competition. A theoretical 
model for Europe” (Pierpaolo 
Giannoccolo, 2006) and „Brain drain, 
fiscal competition and public education 
expenditure” (Hartmut Egger, Josef 
Falkinger, Volker Grossman, 2007). The 
authors drew the attention upon the 
danger generated by tax competition, 
which displays inside the community 
space, upon the migration phenomenon. 
The performed analyses were grounded 
on  building some analysis models of the 
opportunities and risks generated by   
policy in the education field.   
The model presented in the 
paper is an adaptation of the so-called 
”Model of the Brain Drain and Human 
Capital Formation” elaborated by   
Mountford (1997), by which there are 
described the different researched 
variables: brain gain, brain drain, 
migration competition and tax 
competition. 
Obviously, the scenarios may be 
different from country to country 
depending on the different values of the 
two key factors taken into account: 
migration probability (π ) and 
considerable differences of technological 
capacity (η ). .   
 
2. Concepts and definitions 
 
Brain drain or ”human capital flight“ is 
the emigration phenomenon of the 
educated or talented persons due to 
various accounts: conflicts, lack of 
opportunities, and so on. The investment 
in education is lost along with the 
person's departure, who usually doesn't 
come back in his/her  country of origin. 
Within Royal Society of London the term 
of brain drain was used for the first time 
in order to describe the leaving of 
scientists and technicians for USA or 
Canada at the beginning of the 50's in 
the past century. The phenomenon 
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known as  brain drain is still present 
nowadays and it is also defined as a 
constant transfer (drain) of personnel 
with high skills (brain) from certain 
countries, generally less developed, 
towards others which are more 
developed from the economical point of 
view, if it is taken into account the fact 
that main reason of the phenomenon is 
an economic one.   
Therefore, the brain drain is the 
part of the emigration which comprises 
the persons with high skills, universitary 
education.   
It arises from here that the 
difficulty of quantifing the phenomenon, 
as the majority of the states dispose of 
general statistical data concerning 
emigration, but do not dispose of 
distributed statistics which would quantify 
the education level of the  emigrants.  
The phenomenon is associated 
with the “capital flight” term, which refer 
to the capital fight which is not invested in 
the country where its holder lives and 
where it was created. The exodus is 
voluntary, braked by the countries of 
origin and encouraged by the receiving 
countries. 
In the OECD report (1987) there 
are other definitions of the brain drain 
phenomenon: ”Brain drain implies a flow 
of specialists with two directions between 
the country which sends and the one 
which receives. However, the net flow is 
in a decisive manner favoured in only 
one direction, the terms used in this case 
being ”brain gain” (benefit for the country 
of origin and the source country) or ”brain 
drain” (vital loss of human resource for 
the country of origin). A subsequent term 
”brain waste” describes the wasting of 
abilities which takes place when the very 
well trained specialists migrate towards 
certain work places which don't require 
the abilities and experience applied to the 
previous work place.  
Tax competition arises because 
the member states of the European 
Union are in competition in order either to 
attract a mobile taxation basis or to reject 
the mobile taxation beneficiaries. 
Generally,  the work force is less 
mobile than the capital and a work force 
with low skills is less mobile than a work 
force with high skills. As a consequence, 
the tax competition leads to an essential 
change regarding the taxation structure.  
Thus, the governments of the member 
states are forced to reduce the taxation 
level for the factors having a high mobility 
and to increase the tax burden on less 
mobile sources, in order to protect the 
revenues. If there is a tax competition, 
the tax rates shall move, as a 
consequence, from the corporate 
revenues to the personal ones, from the 
capital revenues to the ones from the 
work force, from the high revenue to the 
low one generated by the work force and 
generally from the revenues and welfare 
taxation to consumption's taxation.      
The main results of the evolution 
of taxation level within the European 
Union during the last decades confirms 
exactly the fact that this thing happened.  
Concerning the citizens of the 
European Union, these choose their 
residence in a state which would offer 
them an optimal combination between 
the tax burden and the public assets of 
which they can take advantage for free. 
In the context of the European Union, the 
mobility of the citizens is free of any kind 
of institutional constraints so that the 
cultural integration increases the 
probability of migrating within the Union. 
Especially for that reason, the flow of 
specialists reached a relevant position in 
the research agenda of the European 
Union.  
As a consequence, studying the 
brain drain phenomenon is closely 
connected to the election of the 
specialists' education. If public education 
is good, the skilled specialists may 
migrate, and as a secondary effect, the 
tax competition is accentuating. 
Moreover, if the governments of the 
member states don't coordinate the 
taxation systems and the quality of public 
services (teaching system, especially), a 
series of negative economic effects may 
arise up to the standard of the states.    Year VII, No.7/2008                                                                                                            135 
 
In this context, it is necessary to 
redefine the brain drain phenomenon  up 
to the standard of the member states of 
the European Union, as the tax 
competition may be used as a ”new tool 
of public interest” (Pierpaolo 
Giannoccolo, 2007). Furthermore, when 
the expanded European Union is 
analysed, two types of states may be 
distinguished: old states, with a powerful 
economic development and the new 
member states, with less solid 
economies and low productivity. 
Implicitly, the old member states may 
compete to one another in order to attract 
skilled specialists which belong to the 
countries in Central Europe and Eastern 
Europe, thus arising the ”migration 
competition” phenomenon.  
 
3. Model description 
  
The model respresents a more 
simpler version of the Brain drain model 
and Mountford's  human capital formation 
(1997). Through the model, we study the 
specific case of the European Union in 
which the mobility of the specialists is 
freely allowed, in order to identify the 
possible negative effect generated by the 
interaction between the tax competition 
and brain drain phenomenon. 
The model analyses an opened 
economy, with only one good product 
constantly analysed by means of work 
efficiency unit (L): Yt= XtLt. We suppose 
that the education decision is each 
person's free will, and the citizens of 
each state may choose to be educated or 
not. At the same time, we suppose that 
the rate of the wage on work efficiency 
units is independent of the work force in 
time  t and independent of work 
productivity or technology level λt, which 
is given: wt=λtw. 
Concerning the distribution of 
abilities, the persons own different latent 
ability models, where e to t indicate the 
latent ability of person i. We suppose that 
all generations have  latent abilities which 
are chosen from the same distribution 
and that the children's abilities are 
independent of their parents' abilities. 
 Education.  We suppose that all 
citizens have the same preferences and 
access to the same technology, although 
they don't have the same latent ability 
levels. 
  The citizens who invest in 
education obtain e to t work efficiency 
units, where e to t  is the latent ability 
level of the agent i. Furthermore, let's 
suppose that the citizens who don't invest 
in education have a single work efficiency 
unit and that the costs of education may 
be settled to c exit units 
  The government shall influence 
the education decisions of the citizens by 
taxing the skilled ones, covering a part of 
their education costs. Thus, by granting 
the subventions for education,  the 
education cost becomes c-γt, where γt is 
the subvention for education.  
 Let's  define  Tt  as the marginal 
rate of the specialists' taxes in t 
generation Introducing the tax, the wage 
rate for the work efficiency unit becomes:  




t T we w − = λ  
Migration (π ). Let's suppose that 
emigration is allowed only for the 
specialists (skilled persoans). Let's 
suppose that the probability of a 
successful emigration for the skilled 
citizens born in J  country,  J π , is 
independent of the number of potential 
citizens for emigration. Let's suppose that 
the emigration policy is completely 
anticipated. 
At the same time, we suppose that in 
the model there aren't mobility costs, so 
that the skilled specialists decide if they 
migrate or not, as an answer to the 
different wages which they receive. Their 
future wage is connected to the taxing 
policy of the states and to the difference 
of technology between countries. 
Therefore, the skilled citizens shall rather 
stay in the J country if: 







= η  
and I is the country which offers to the 
skilled specialists a better wage.    
So, we may differentiate three 
different stages: 
Case (1): all educated persons 
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Case (2): all educated persons wish to 
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4. Brain drain or brain gain? 
 
As we have shown above, the 
brain drain phenomenon represents the 
specialists' migration from a country to 
another, without the source country 
having any benefit of it.  The brain gain 
phenomenon arises also from the 
bidirectional movement between the 
member states, but here there is a 
benefit from the emigration. Thus, in 
order to better understand the role of 
emigration in the raising and 
development of the member states, it is 
necessary to perform an analysis from 
which to grow out the existence or 
voidness of the situations when the 
emigration increases the number of 
specialists in both states (bidirectional 
movement), thus increasing the 
development of the states. Bellow we 
shall analyse only the first case 
previously presented and namely the 
case in which all specialists wish to 
migrate in the J country. 




t T T ) 1 ( η η − + 〈 :  all 
skilled persons wish to migrate in the J 
country.  
 But the J country doesn't lose its 
specialists and attracts only the skilled 
ones from other countries. Therefore, in 
order to analyse the possibility of the 
”benefit” from emigration (Brain gain) we 
study the countries from which they come 
from.  
The medium proportion of the 
skilled persons in the economy I is given 


























If  π = 1 then the source economy 
loses all its specialists and  0 =
N
t S .  
If  π  = 0 then inside the union the 
emigration doesn't exist. Therefore, an 
adequate condition for the existence of a 
positive level of specialists' transfer so 
that the economy to take advantage 
concerning the productivity is   




 when π  = 0. The 






Thus, if there are big wage 
differences on the productivity of the 
work unit and there is a defective mobility 
of the skilled specialists then a positive 
optimum level of emigration arises if   
A
t I t I T T , , 0 ≤ 〈  
As a consequence, the source 
economy may take advantage of the 
brain drain if there is an adequate 
number of persons who would invest in 
education. Going further with the 
correlations, the tax competiţion 
displayed by taxation and education 
valorization implies two different results. 
Therefore, the successive  taxation of the 
work force reduces a lot the probability 
that the new-comers to be under ”optimal 
brain drain” conditions. On the other 
hand, the taxes increase the wage 
differences between the entrance country 
and the others and thus it increases the 
possibility of gaining from the brain drain, 
exclusive benefit for the destination 
country.  





Brain Gain. When the J country 
is less productive than the I country and 
the probability of emigration π  is low, it 
means that we find ourselves in the 
scenario described by Mauntford (1997).  
Thus, the specialists' migration 
may raise the productivity and the 
medium equality in the source economy 
(brain gain). In the European context, this 
scenario may be possible when the new-
comer of the European Union is less 
productive than the first (but without 
existing major differences). In this 
scenario, the optimal policy of the 
European Union's institutions is to take 
no action. 
Brain Drain. The differences 
between countries are so big that the 
country with the highest productivity 
attracts in an unilateral manner the 
specialists from other countries. This 
scenario is usually studied by speciality 
literature, which often refers to the 
unidirectional flow of the over-skilled 
work force from the less developed 
countries. This literature explained the 
human capital flight as being a ”negative 
taxation externality” due to imigration. 
The possibility that the welfare of those 
who remain in the less developed 
countries to be reduced by the exodus of 
the skilled persons was also 
acknowledged in literature.    
From the paper of Grubel and 
Scott, Berry and Soligo and Harry 
Johnson in the 60's, the main conclusion 
was that the welfare of those who didn't 
emigrate should decrease only if the 
contribution of the emigranţs to the 
national production was higher than their 
income. In this scenario (in which our 
country is included also) the optimal 
policy of the European Union's 
institutions is to introduce a “tax on brain 
drain” in order to compensate the 
permanent loss of human resource for 
the source country. 
Emigration competition. In this 
case the states don't have major 
productivity differences and compete 
attracting the skilled specialists 
(emigration competitions), usually from 
the countries less developed from the 
economic point of view. The main 
directions by means of which the 
specialists may be attracted could be 
summarized as it follows:  
-  building a more opened and 
flexible academic system; 
-  improving the regulatory   
conditions, especially upon imigration;  
-  a better information up to the 
national standard; 
-  promoting on a large scale of 
the scholarships for the foreign 
researchers;  
- homogenizing  the  wage 
incomes for similar trainings on the work 
force market;   
-  reducing the taxes, especially 
for the researchers and intellectuals;  
-  promoting a more active 
international marketing and support for 
the internaţional researchers.  
Tax competition. The 
emigration probability is high (or very 
close) and the countries have the same 
productivity (or almost the same). In this 
case, the possibility that all skilled 
specialists to leave suggests the 
adjustment of investments in education.  
In the European context, this 
scenario is possible within the first 
member states of the European Union. In 
this scenario, the optimal policy of the 
European Union's institutions is to 
coordinate all member states and to 
define a common line regarding the 
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